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Recent Developments 
Montgomery County v. Lake: 
EMPLOYER NOT ALLOWED TO 
OFFSET OVERPAYMENT OF 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS 
In Montgomery County v. Lake, 68 Md. 
App. 269, 511 A.2d 541 (1986), a case of 
first impression, the Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals held that Maryland Code 
Ann. Art. 101, § 56, does not allow an em-
ployer to offset the overpayment of work-
men's compensation benefits in one claim 
against a second award granted to an in-
jured employee. In so holding, the court 
affirmed the decision by the Circuit Court 
for Montgomery County. 
The appellee, Charles Lake, a Mont-
gomery County employee, made two sepa-
rate claims for workmen's compensation 
benefits. On his first claim, the Workers' 
Compensation Commission determined 
that Lake sustained a thirty percent loss of 
the use of his body because of injury to his 
lungs and ordered permanent partial dis-
ability benefits for a period of 150 weeks. 
On the second claim, the Commission de-
termined that Lake suffered a five percent 
loss of his right hand and a fifteen percent 
loss of the use of his body as a result ofin-
juries to his nose, right shoulder and right 
elbow sustained after a second unrelated 
injury. The Commission ordered benefits 
for this injury for a period of87.5 weeks. 
Id. at 271,511 A.2d at 542. 
Montgomery County appealed the Com-
mission's decision. The Circuit Court for 
Montgomery County granted the County's 
motion for partial summary judgment and 
ordered that the payments awarded on the 
second claim not be paid until the payments 
under the first claim were completed. After 
the decision by the circuit court, Lake ap-
plied to the Commission for a lump sum 
payment of the amount awarded on the 
first claim. The Commission granted the 
application and accelerated $4,000.00 of 
the $4,711.00 then due Lake under that 
award.Id. 
In a jury trial on the first claim, the 
County won its appeal and the jury reduced 
Lake's permanent partial disability from 
thirty percent to ten percent. This reduc-
tion created an overpayment of$8,900.00 
in benefits on the first claim because all of 
the payments due under that claim had al-
ready been paid. At the time of the jury's 
decision, there remained $1,600.00 unpaid 
on the second claim. The County, in an ef-
fort to recoup the overpayment, suspended 
the payment of benefits due under the sec-
ond claim without either formal notice to 
Lake or prior approval by the Commission. 
Lake complained to the Commission and a 
hearing was conducted in which the Com-
mission ruled that the County was not en-
titled to offset the overpayment in the first 
claim against the unpaid, unaccrued bene-
fits awarded in the second claim. Id. at 
272, 511 A.2d at 542-43. 
The County appealed the Workers' Com-
pensation Commission's orders to the Cir-
cuit Court for Montgomery County. The 
court upheld the decision of the Commis-
sion reasoning that, "[t]here is a presump-
tion of propriety that attaches to any deter-
mination by the Workmen's Compensation 
Commission .... " Id. at 272, 511 A.2d 
at 543. 
On appeal to the Maryland Court of 
Special Appeals, the County asserted that 
the overpayment of compensation benefits 
in one claim should be offset against the 
same type of benefits awarded in another 
claim when the latter benefits are unpaid 
and unaccrued when the overpayment 
arose. The County also contended that a 
credit was necessary to prevent unjust 
enrichment to Lake because he received 
benefits in excess of that which he was en-
titled. Id. at 274, 511 A.2d at 544. 
In rejecting the County's claims, the 
court of special appeals observed that it is 
firmly established in Maryland that once 
moneys are paid out on a claim, those funds 
are not recoverable "on any theory," ab-
sent fraud, even if the award is reduced or 
reversed on appeal. Id. at 274, 511 A.2d at 
544 (citing St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. 
v. Treadwell, 263 Md. 430, 439 (1971». 
The County had contended that it was not 
seeking recovery back of funds paid out, 
but instead was merely offsetting funds 
overpaid in one claim against unpaid, un-
accrued funds awarded in a second claim, 
and therefore St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. 
Co. was not applicable. The Maryland 
Court of Special Appeals concluded that 
whether the County terms it "offset" or 
"recovery back," the effect is the same and 
the claimant is deprived of funds awarded 
to him for a separate injury. Id. at 275, 511 
A.2d at 544. 
The Court noted that the Maryland 
Court of Appeals has held that ''the Work-
men's Compensation Act establishes a pro-
cedure of its own covering every phase of 
the right to compensation and of the pro-
cedure for obtaining and enforcing it, 
which procedure is complete and exclusive 
in itself." St. Paul Fire & Man·ne Ins. Co., 
263 Md. at 436 (quoting Tompkins v. 
George Rinner Constr. Co., 409 P.2d 1001, 
1003 (1966». In St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co., the court interpreted Art. 101, 
§ 56 and concluded that since the Act did 
not provide a procedure for recovery of 
funds after overpayment, it was the intent 
of the legislature to prohibit such a right. 
Id. The court in Lake similarly held that 
since the compensation statute does not 
provide a procedure to offset separate 
claims when overpayment results, the leg-
islature did not intend to permit this pro-
cedure. Id. See also Mayor and City Coun-
cil of Baltimore v. Oros, 301 Md. 460, 483 
A.2d 748 (1984). 
The court in Lake then addressed the 
question of whether recovery back of funds 
is permissible where the sum paid out on a 
claim was awarded under the lump sum 
provisions of the Act. The court analyzed 
the holding in Bayshore Indus., Inc. v. 
Ziats, 229 Md. 69, 76-77 181 A.2d.652 
(1962), which found that "a stay of pay-
ment awarded by reasons of an appeal 
challenging the underlying award is pro-
hibited." 68 Md. App. at 577, 511 A.2d at 
545. The Bayshore Indus., Inc. court also 
held that "the purpose behind the pro-
hibition is that of affording day-to-day 
support to an injured employee and his or 
her dependents." Id. Following this ra-
tionale, the court of appeals in St. Paul 
Fire & Marine Ins. Co. held that restitu-
tion or recovery back of payments would 
not be permitted because "it is not the in-
tention and spirit of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act to allow an employer to 
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recover back money paid under an award 
which already has been spent by a claim-
ant for living expenses." /d. 
In Lake, the Maryland Court of Special 
Appeals stated that they are not unmindful 
of the potential inequities presented by 
this appeal. In theory, no one would dis-
agree that funds which are disbursed with-
out ultimate legal vindication should be 
recoverable, however, after a lump sum 
award is made, it is difficult to justify tak-
ing back the money which has already been 
used for living expenses. This question 
poses a real dilemma and until the legis-
lature addresses these problems, these po-
tential inequities will surely occur again. 
- J. Russell Fentress IV 
Anderson v. Bimblich: RECOVERY 
OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS PRECLUDES 
RECOVERY IN TORT ACTION 
The Court of Special Appeals of Mary-
land in A nderson v. Bimblich, 67 Md. App. 
612,508 A.2d 1014 (1986), has held that 
an employee of a property management 
company under contract to the owners of 
an apartment building, injured while per-
forming custodial duties under a subcon-
tract with the building owners, and recov-
ers worker's compensation benefits, may 
not later pursue a tort action against the 
owners if they are deemed "principal con-
tractors," thus constituting a statutory em-
ployer within the meaning of the Worker's 
Compensation Act (the "Act"), Md. Ann. 
Code art. 10 1, § 62 (1985). 
On December 10, 1981, appellant Cyril 
Anderson suffered serious injuries result-
ing in the amputation of his right hand 
while operating a trash compactor in his 
capacity as custodian at the Barbazon 
Plaza Apartment complex. At the time 
of the accident Anderson was employed 
by the Smith-Braedon Property Co., 
("Smithy") pursuant to a contract with the 
appellees, Barbazon Plaza Associates (Bar-
bazon), a partnership of which the named 
defendant Bimblich was a member. Under 
the terms of the contract, Smithy was to 
provide property management, custodial, 
and maintenance services for the apart-
ment complex. Anderson subsequently 
filed for and received worker's compensa-
tion benefits for his injury. 
Unsatisfied, Anderson proceeded to file 
a "third party" suit against Barbazon, al-
leging negligence in the latter's mainte-
nance of a defective and dangerous trash 
compactor on the premises. Anderson's 
suit was filed pursuant to § 58 of the Work-
er's Compensation Act, which provides 
that an injured employee who previously 
20-The Law Forum/Winter, 1987 
received benefits under the Act, could also 
elect to seek damages against a person 
other than the employer for negligence 
jointly caused by the employer and some 
other third party. See Md. Ann. Code, 
art. 101, § 58 (1985). 
In the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, Barbazon filed for, and the trial 
judge granted, a motion for summary 
judgment on the grounds that Barbazon 
was Anderson's statutory employer within 
the meaning of§ 58 of the Act. Under the 
exclusive remedy provisions of§ 15 of the 
Act, an employee was barred from suing 
his employer to recover damages arising 
out of the employer's negligence if the em-
ployee previously elected to seek benefits 
under the Act. See Md. Ann. Code, art. 
101, § 15 (1985). Undeterred, Anderson 
appealed. 
Presented with a case of first impression, 
the court addressed the question of whether 
the appellees (Barbazon) were the statutory 
employer of Anderson, which if answered 
in the affirmative, would bar Anderson's 
recovery as a matter oflaw. 
The court first determined that the ex-
clusive remedy provisions of § 15 of the 
Act barred an employee who had previously 
elected to recover worker's compensation 
from later suing his employer for tort dam-
ages. The court next determined that not-
withstanding § 15, an employee could 
undertake to sue a person other than the 
employer to recover tort damages, so long 
as the party sued was not his statutory em-
ployer within the meaning of § 62 of the 
Act. 
To determine whether the appellees in 
the instant case were the statutory em-
ployers of Anderson, the court relied on 
the holding of the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland in Honaker v. W.C. and A.N. 
Miller Dev. Co., 278 Md. 453, 365 A.2d 
287 (1976). In considering whether the 
employer was a "principal contractor",. 
and thus the statutory employer of an em-
ployee injured while installing a slate roof, 
the Honaker court specified four elements 
that must be satisfied to bring an employer 
within the scope of§ 62. The four elements 
are: (1) a principal contractor; (2) who has 
contracted to perform work; (3) which is a 
part of his trade, business, or occupation; 
and (4) who has contracted with any other 
party as a subcontractor for the execution 
by or under the subcontractor of the whole 
or any part of such work. Anderson, 67 
Md. App. at 617,508 A.2d at 1016. 
The key determinant under Honaker was 
whether the contract between the principal 
contractor and the subcontractor arose out 
of the original contract between the parties, 
or resulted from a contract entered into by 
the principal contractor and a third party. 
As applied to the case at bar, if the subcon-
tract for custodial services arose out of the 
original contract between Barbazon and 
Smithy, Barbazon as "principal contractor" 
would be designated as the statutory em-
ployer of Anderson. However, the Honaker 
court cautioned that the preliminary find-
ing was subject to application of the "es-
sential or integral part" test. Under this 
test, a finding that the "subcontracted work 
is an 'essential or integral' part of the prin-
cipal contractor's business" is required. 
Miller Dev. Co. v. Honaker, 40 Md. App. 
185,388 A.2d 562 (1978), a/i'd, 285 Md: 
216,401 A.2d 1013 (1979). 
In applying the elements of the test set 
forth in Honaker to the facts of the case at 
bar, the court found that the first two ele-
ments were satisfied by evidence contained 
in the tenant-lease agreements which clearly 
designated Smithy as an agent/landlord of 
Barbazon. Additionally, the court found 
that a subcontract between Barbazon and 
the tenants to provide custodial services 
existed because of the landlord's promise, 
contained in the leases, to "deliver the 
premises and all areas in a clean, safe, and 
sanitary condition." Anderson, 67 Md. 
App. at 619,508 A.2d at 1017. 
The court further held that the third ele-
ment of Honaker was satisfied by the fact 
that the subcontract to provide custodial 
services for the benefit of the tenants was 
"an essential or integral" part ofBarbazon's 
business as apartment owners. Lastly, the 
court held that the fourth element was sat-
isfied because the maintenance subcontract 
was viewed as being part of the original 
property management contract between the 
appellees and Smithy, and not the result of 
a separate contract between Barbazon and 
some other third party, in this case the 
tenants themselves. 
In holding that apartment owners who 
contract with a property management 
company to provide custodial services by 
way of a subcontract are the "principal 
contractors," and thus the statutory em-
ployer of a custodian injured during the 
course of his employment, the court has 
expanded the meaning of statutory em-
ployer under § 62 of the Worker's Com-
pensation Act to encompass apartment 
building owners. The decision of the court 
thus extends the protections inherent in 
the Act to apartment building owners who 
subcontract for custodial services under 
a pre-existing property management con-
tract. Employees injured through the em-
ployer's negligence who have previously 
elected to seek benefits under § 15 of the 
Act, will continue to be precluded from 
bringing suit against a statutory employer 
as defined under § 62 of the Act. 
- Kenneth S. Savell 
